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INTRODUCTION 
Climate change has become in 20 years one of the greatest economic, 
environmental and social challenges of our modern society. A wide variety of 
organizations – NGOs, governments, business, international bodies, local 
communities, research think tanks – are working together to design and implement a 
low carbon society. In this particularly uncertain context, characterized by distributed, 
lacunar, messy and sometimes contradictory scientific knowledge, the actors fail to 
converge on a common project regarding the architecture of a low carbon society. 
Projects and visions vary among actors and over time. Nevertheless, it is commonly 
admitted among experts and economists that a carbon price that would be stable, 
predictable and fair could provide the long term coordination that is needed to drive 
the implementation of a low carbon society. “A price of carbon would solve any 
problem” said a French expert in a recent interview1. A ‘right’ price of carbon would 
diffuse in the economy and provide long term drive for technology breakthroughs and 
switch to low carbon products said another one2. Such a ‘right’ carbon price would 
then stir up the profound societal changes that are required. In Europe, these great 
expectations over a ‘right’ carbon price have aroused an on-going design activity that 
enables the existence of the European carbon market (EU-ETS).  
The ‘official’ story of how carbon markets were designed and implemented, as it is 
told in economic handbooks and in the press, is well known and widely documented 
(e.g. Braun, 2009; Ellerman & al, 2010; Hourcade, 2002; Cass, 2005; Wetestad, 
2005). According to this story, environmental economics is supposed to be 
particularly performative as it presents carbon markets as the output of thirty years of 
research program in environmental economics initiated in 1960 by Ronald Coase and 
his famous article, ‘the problem of social costs’. This common representation tends to 
overlook three activities that enabled the concrete performation of theoretical 
economy; that is to say design, negotiation and revision.  
We propose to adopt the perspective of (Callon 2009): “How are the different 
knowledge and know-how transported, experience capitalized on, and evaluations 
conducted?” We claim in this paper that in the case of carbon markets, the existence 
of design spaces that mediate between economics and economy (Guala, 2007) is 
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central to explain the performation of the EU-ETS. We define a design space 
(Hatchuel, Le Masson, & Weil, 2005), as a collective working space where designers 
can act in a way that enables them “to learn on what has to be learnt” (Hatchuel & al, 
2005). Most of them are governed by visible actors (like the European Commission, 
scientific think tanks or NGO’s): their activity is made public and has already been 
studied. We chose to focus here on a more unknown kind of ‘design lab’ governed by 
industrial actors. As the industry is not  invited to participate to environmaental policy 
making, their engineering activity is quite discreet, even hidden, which makes it 
difficult to observe. The European electricity sector set up such a lab after the Kyoto 
protocol3 to explore what carbon markets might be and since then has run 
experiments to test new parameters on carbon markets. From 1999 up to now, they 
have designed a range of experiments that have played a key role in the 
performation of carbon markets. Building on the notion of ‘skunk work’ proposed by 
Peters (1997), to designate processes of internal entrepreneurship that are informally 
developed within corporations, we propose to label those subterranean design 
spaces as ‘skunk labs’. 
Building on Muniesa and Callon (2007), we explore further the notion of platform, 
focusing on the experimental activity they support. How were such design spaces 
organized? How were the experimentations instrumented? How did their 
instrumentation evolve? What type of knowledge was produced? Using a design 
theory approach, we model knowledge dynamics to highlight the complexity of the 
design activity that is undertaken by actors. 
 
COMMON KNOWLEDGE ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN 
CARBON MARKET: PERFORMING THEORY  
The ‘official’ story of how a low carbon future commitment drove the performation 
of theoretical environmental markets into the real economy is very well established 
among the climate community (scholars, governments, NGOs, business, etc.) and 
documented (e.g. Braun, 2009; de Perthuis & al, 2010; Hourcade, 2002; Cass, 2005; 
Wetestad, 2005). 
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  The  Kyoto  Protocol  was  adopted  in  Kyoto,  Japan,  on  11  December  1997.  It  is  an  international  agreement 
linked  to  the  United  Nations  Framework  Convention  on  Climate  Change.  The  major  feature  of  the  Kyoto 
Protocol is that it sets binding targets for 37 industrialized countries and the European community for reducing 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions .These amount to an average of five per cent against 1990 levels over the five‐
year period 2008‐2012. 
“In order to reach the Community’s emissions reduction commitment of minus 
8% compared to 1990 agreed to in the Kyoto Protocol the European 
Commission proposed the establishment of a European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in the framework of its Post-Kyoto Strategy in June 
1998 (European Commission, 1998). The proposal was followed by a Green 
Paper in March 2000 (European Commission, 2000), a draft directive of the 
European Commission in October 2001 (European Commission, 2001a), and a 
binding EU framework directive – the European Emissions Trading Directive – 
on 13 October 2003 (European Commission, 2003a). After having been 
implemented by all EU Member States, the EU ETS finally went into effect on 1 
January 2005.” (Braun, 2009). 
The common knowledge on the construction of the EU-ETS emphasizes two aspects 
of the performation of theoretical carbon markets: (1) the European carbon market 
stems from Coase’s theoretical framework that has been enriched by economic 
engineering; (2) the implementation of pure economics was hindered by the 
bargaining of stakeholders.  
 
Building the European Carbon Market; Performing Theory 
Initial theoretical research focused on the design of ‘efficient’ economic 
instruments to address negative externalities. The idea of using a market to manage 
industrial emissions can be traced to Coase (1960). In his seminal article – the 
problem of social costs – he showed that, in the absence of transaction costs, a clear 
definition of property rights would lead to an efficient allocation of resources. Crocker 
(1966), Dales (1968) and Montgomery (1972) further developed Coase’s theoretical 
framework. The idea of delivering an emission price through a ‘cap-and-trade’ 
instrument, i.e. a regulated market, was initially formulated by Dales (1968) in his 
book Markets in Pollution Rights, for tackling pollution problems. Then, Montgomery 
(1972) introduced an emission cost function in the management settings of the firm, 
relating each level of emissions to its cost. The idea of emission trading gained 
traction, based on the belief that a TDP4 system could help to achieve a better quality 
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 Transferable Discharge Permits 
of air while at the same time using substantially less resources than classic 
instruments such as taxes5. 
Market-based instruments to control emissions remained the fantasy of 
academics and existed only in peer journals until the first concrete projects were set 
up in California in the mid-1970s. Between 1976 and the late 1980s, the attempts to 
implement market instruments were not particularly convincing; however, they did 
fuel further theoretical thoughts, which gave birth to a large normative literature (e.g. 
Hahn & Hester 1989; Tietenberg 1980; Hahn 1984a, Hahn 1984b) that focused on 
the optimal design6 of environmental markets. From 1976 to 1979, different formulas 
such as netting, offsets, bubbles and banking were introduced and explored, 
principally by the EPA (Godard, 2000). In the early 1980s, the design features that 
optimize market efficiency were clearly identified, such as permit allocation (Hahn, 
1984a), geographical scope, sectoral coverage, monitoring (Hahn, 1984b) and 
penalties.  
In 1995, the EPA launched the first ‘cap-and-trade’ market instrument at a 
national level, which is often considered to be the direct ancestor of the EU-ETS 
(Damro & Mendez, 2003). It was a key development for carbon markets as policy 
instruments (Ellerman et al., 2000).  
 
Implementing a Second-best Instrument as a Consequence of Bargaining 
among Actors  
Economists often highlight the gap between ideal ‘cap-and-trade’ systems as 
designed within economic theory and real carbon markets, as a consequence of 
bargaining among stakeholders.  
From the Rio conference in 1992 to the Kyoto protocol in 1997, the debate among 
scholars crystallized on the selection of appropriate policy instruments. Some 
economic scholars argued that market-based instruments had the potential to 
achieve emissions reductions at lower cost than traditional command-and-control 
                                                             
5
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6
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efficiency (air quality restored to a given target) 
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instruments (Hahn, 1983; Plott, 1983; Tietenberg, 1985). Controversies remain about 
their ability to deliver the stable and predictable price of carbon that is necessary to 
provide long-term anticipations for ‘low carbon’ investments. This theoretical concern 
shaped the political debate, leaving policy makers with two main tasks: setting 
emission reduction goals, and selecting policy instruments to achieve them (Stavins, 
1995). According to this story, both the implementation and design of the EU-ETS is 
a ‘second best’ policy instrument that resulted from the combination of three 
elements:  
- First, the European Union unsuccessfully defended its position on “coordinated 
politics and measures” during the negotiation cycles, against the US “emissions 
trading” proposal promoted by US experts, OECD, AIE, (Braun, 2009), the US 
government (Hourcade, 2002), the Environmental Defense Fund (Dudeck & Leblanc, 
1992) the US industry lobbies (Levy & Egan, 2003; Newell & Paterson, 1998) etc. An 
accumulation of misunderstandings and cultural ideological conditioning, reinforced 
by unclear negotiation strategies, distorted the debate and eventually led to an 
unexpected compromise: the Kyoto Protocol (Hourcade 2003). As a matter of fact, 
the EU ultimately accepted emissions trading as the price for securing US 
participation in the Kyoto Protocol (Cass, 2005). 
- Second, the European Commission failed in its initiative to introduce a carbon 
energy tax at the domestic level. When the Commission proposed an EU-wide 
carbon energy tax in 1992, it mainly faced two opposing forces: the European 
principle ensuring the fiscal autonomy of member states (unanimity is required), and 
the pressure exerted by industry lobbies. This opposition led to the withdrawal of the 
carbon energy tax proposal in 1997 (Braun, 2009; Wettestad, 2005).  
- Third, the design of the European carbon market was then bargained between 
stakeholders within the stakeholder meetings held by the European Commission in 
2001. 
 
The Untold Story of ‘Skunk Labs’ 
According to the story described above, the current design of the EU-ETS results 
from two activities: theory building on carbon markets and negotiating design 
parameters among stakeholders. 
This axiomatic interpretation of what happens misses an important part of the 
story that is the collective sense-making that enabled to create knowledge and 
eventually to shape carbon markets (Braun, 2009). Such a collective sense-making 
involved experimental activities held in several distributed design spaces, 
characterized as laboratories and platforms (Muniesa and Callon, 2007). Such design 
spaces are ”located” at the frontier of multiple worlds and enable the circulation and 
materialization of concepts from one world to another. We know little about their 
organization and the way they support collective learning and concrete market 
practices. 
One of these design spaces – which we called ‘skunk lab’ because its traces 
were erased for political reasons – was governed by the power sector and played a 
considerable role in the materialization of the EU-ETS. This design space was built 
around a specific instrument: the GETS (Greenhouse Gas and Electricity Trading 
Simulation), a collective experiment run by major electric suppliers in Europe within 
the Eurelectric industrial association. As we shall demonstrate, the GETS experiment 
played a key-role in organizing debates, enrolling new allies (including policy makers) 
and building collective expectations around carbon markets.  
 
 
FROM A WORLD TO ANOTHER, EXPERIMENTATION DEVICES AS MEDIATING 
INSTRUMENTS 
How the Notion of Performativity Opens a Space for reflection  
The notion of performativity questions the relations between multiple constructed 
worlds – in particular, between the economy and economics (Callon, 2006). Ideas 
circulate; they are being transferred, reshaped, translated, materialised in these 
different worlds. Hand-crafted images such as models (algorithms, equations, 
physical models, , visions of the future (expectations, utopias, fictions) act as 
mediating instruments by linking actors and domains belonging to apparently 
separated worlds (Borup & al, 2006; Joly, 2010; MacKenzie & Millo, 2003; Miller & 
O’Leary, 2007; Nyberg & Wright, 2011).  
Materiality is central in shaping the notion of performativity. The way scientific 
practices, technical instruments and experimentation produce objective reality has 
been explored within science anthropology (see e.g. Hacking, 1983; Galison, 1997). 
For instance, the intentional reorganization of sociotechnical arrangements to enable 
the performation of finance theory was explored in a pioneering study conducted by 
MacKenzie and Millo (MacKenzie and Millo, 2003; MacKenzie, 2003, 2006) 
 The Role of in vitro Experimentation: Laboratories and Platforms 
Performation is a collective activity. It is a process within which socio-technical 
arrangements are being modified and redesigned to enable the existence and 
relevance of a new statement, concept, image, theory or model (Muniesa & Callon, 
2008). The purposeful circulation of models from a world to another involves 
exploring and testing the conditions under which such images become true in the 
projected world; it involves a design activity. Building the vehicles of performation is a 
politic activity undertaken by purposeful actors through the recombination, 
reconfiguration, ‘bricolage’ and production of knowledge. Experimental activity plays 
a considerable role in this translation process (see e.g. Guala, 2007). Muniesa and 
Callon (2007) explore the notion of ‘laboratories’ and ‘platforms’ to refer to those 
spaces where experimental activities are led, at the junction between multiple worlds. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN: THE DYNAMICS OF KNOWLEDGE IN ‘SKUNK LABS’ 
Drawing on the case study of the Greenhouse Gas and Electricity Trading 
Simulation (GETS) undertaken by Eurelectric from 1999 to 2001 we explore the 
dynamics of knowledge – its multiple sources, its construction through innovative 
experiments, and its bricolage – that supported the materialisation of carbon markets 
and its initial institutionalization within the EU-ETS. We describe the experimental 
activities that supported the conjoint process of design and performation of carbon 
markets through a double analytical framework. Using a design theory framework, we 
first map the knowledge dynamics and then we come back to the consequences of 
these knowledge dynamics on actors’ relations.  
Building on the GETS’ case study, we then enrich the notion of experimental 
platform proposed by Muniesa and Callon (2007). The GETS’ skun lab is indeed a 
good example of such an experimental configuration.    
 
METHODOLOGY 
Data Collection  
 We held a longitudinal qualitative case study analysis (Pettigrew, 1990). The data 
was collected during a two years in depth investigation, from December 2009 to 
December 2011.   
The first interview with Jean-Yves Caneill, head of climate policy at Electricité de 
France (EDF), the European leader in the electricity sector, was held on Tuesday 15 
December 2009 in Copenhagen at the 15th Conference of Parties on Climate 
Change. He filled us in with many details about how the European electricity sector 
historically engaged in the “backstage“ of the construction process of the EU-ETS. 
He drew our attention to a point that appeared to be of major interest: before its 
institutionalization in 2003 the electricity sector had been designing a version of 
carbon markets that presented disturbing similarities with the pilot directive. This is 
how we came to acknowledge the existence of a wide subterranean knowledge 
building activity within the business sector. 
Back home, we began investigating more the “GETS” case study. We held a set of 
16 semi-directed interviews (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) among the organisers 
and participants of the GETS. The primary data we used to cross back with the 
interviews are public archive documents (the GETS reports) as well as unpublished 
documents that relate to the experimentation and its evolution. We also had access 
to archive documents that relate the simulation and to the European Commission’s 
stakeholder consultation summary reports.  
 
Presentation of the Case Study 
After Kyoto, the European electricity sector was facing three major challenges. 
First, it was difficult to imagine what carbon markets might look like and what would 
be the consequences of such mechanisms at the utility level. Second, the sector was 
facing fierce opposition regarding the desirability of a carbon market. Third, the 
recent Europe wide liberalization of the sector raised the problem of the compatibility 
of carbon trading with the new architecture the electricity market. From 1999 to 2001, 
Eurelectric7 engaged in a wide collective experiment on carbon trading.  
 
1997-1998. Gathering knowledge 
In 1997, one member of Eurelectric organized a trip to the US to gather practical 
knowledge on emission trading from the utilities that were under the SO2 scheme. 
They also met with members of the EPA that filled them in with some theoretical 
features and “learnings” regarding the SO2 scheme.  
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1999. GETS 1: Designing a generic carbon market model 
At the beginning of 1999, Eurelectric invited ‘ParisBourse trading exchange’ (an 
organization specialized in electronic trading for the Paris stock exchange) and the 
International Energy Agency to organize a sector wide simulation of carbon markets. 
The simulation was organized as follows: 
 “The simulation period lasted eight weeks, and covering the 2000-2012 time 
scale. Each week represented either one or two years of activity. Virtual companies 
could trade electricity and CO2 once a week for two hours” (GETS1, 1999).  
 
2000. GETS 2: Collective crafting on the generic model  
Building on the feedbacks of GETS1, the second market model received a more 
sophisticated design. The generic model was made deliberately simple to enable fast 
learning. As we shall see further, the model used for the second simulation 
addressed the short comings of the generic model. It was also enriched by new 
actors entering the simulation that brought original knowledge on carbon trading. 
GETS 2 aimed at testing a more complex set of rules encompassing the investigation 
of diverse options for the European carbon market’s architecture and justifying the 
selection of a  particular one. 
The management of the design space was re-organized. Six new industrial 
sectors8 were invited to participate in three sets of simulations. “To enhance the 
results obtained, three successive simulations were organized (Gets2.1 in 
February/March, Gets2.2 in April, and Gets 2.3 in June), thus making it possible to 
test and/or improve various assumptions” (GETS 2, 2000). A Steering Committee 
was created to monitor the simulation and to ‘theorize the output’; it included former 
organizers of GETS 1 and was chaired by the Eurelectric Working Group on Climate 
Change.  
 
2001. Back to the Lab; Testing Parameters 
A sensitivity analysis was held by Eurelectric in 2001 to test the effect of 
diverse parameters according to so-called economic efficiency criteria. For instance, 
multiple auctions formats, and their effects at both micro and macro levels were 
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 all of the sectors discussed in European Commission’s  green paper on greenhouse gas emissions trading 
tested. This particular form of the GETS allowed the electricity sector to present new 
solid evidence to sustain their position.  
 
Data Analysis: The Concept-Knowledge Theory Approach 
Using design theory to model the emergence of the European Carbon market place 
We aim at unveiling how this skunk lab has been a central design space 
(Hatchuel, Le Masson, & Weil, 2005) that gave birth to and shaped the European 
carbon market place. To model the series of interactions that led to build new 
knowledge on the matter and to explore different possible rules for managing and 
implementing a carbon market, we build on a framework provided by recent 
development in Concept-Knowledge design theory (C-K theory), which models 
design reasoning (Hatchuel & Weil, 2009; Le Masson, Weil, & Hatchuel, 2010; Shai, 
Reich, Hatchuel, & Subrahmanian, 2009). C-K design theory explains invention, 
creation, and discovery within a design framework and models creative reasoning. 
We propose to use this framework to model the different steps that led the GETS 
experimentation to shape the European carbon market place. We first present the 
structure of C-K theory and its principles. Then we explicit the three steps of the  
GETS experiment, that are (1) mapping the existing knowledge, (2) generating 
different conceptual models and the associate values and (3) converging on one 
design path. 
 
C-K theory, framework and principles 
The theory is based on several propositions that we present briefly; the proofs of 
these propositions are given in more detail in (Hatchuel & Weil, 2009). 
C-K theory is a cognitive theory; it allows modeling the fundamental logic of 
innovation design reasoning. It is named « C-K theory » as its core proposition is the 
formal distinction between «Concepts » and « Knowledge ». C-K theory models the 
design process through interactions and expansions of the concept space (C-space) 
and the knowledge space (K-space). One space, defined as the Concept space (C-
Space), is tree-structured and describes the progressive generation of alternatives, 
which are undecidable propositions, i.e. propositions that are ideas and not yet 
knowledge. The other space, defined as the Knowledge space (K space), is formed 
by the network of knowledge that is used for the generative process of the Concept 
space.  
Using the principles of C-K design theory allow to model the creative process as 
the interrelated expansion of these two spaces. The C-space describes the stepwise 
exploration of ‘desirable alternatives’. The list of attributes increases until the 
description of one of the potential design paths is so well defined that a ‘conjunction’ 
between the C-space and the K-space appears. A conjunction, i.e. a concept that 
develops into a piece of knowledge, can be then interpreted as ‘a solution’. On the 
other hand, the knowledge involved in the process constitutes the K-space. C-K 
theory then sets the framework for a structured and manageable design process 
based on refining and expanding the initial concept by adding attributes stemming 
from the K-space or challenging it.  
The development of C-K theory both offers good insights on how to reason in the 
unknown, and provides empirical guidelines on how to use those design formalisms 
to visualize design paths and design strategies (Hatchuel, Le Masson, & Weil, 2004). 
(Hatchuel & Weil, 2009) argue that C-K theory gives insights on how to fruitfully 
represent design reasoning, as interactions between the two spaces match the 
particular cognitive efforts that designers deploy during the design process. 
Using a C-K diagram has been used in diverse cases to allow a representation of 
design reasoning (Gillier, Piat, Roussel, & Truchot, 2010; Hatchuel et al., 2004; 
Hooge, Agogué, & Gillier, 2012), either during and after the design process in order 
to support actors in the explanation of the design choices and the linkages between 
the concepts explored and the associated knowledge.  
 
USING C-K THEORY TO MODEL THE STEPS OF THE GETS 
EXPERIMENTATION 
We propose now to follow this line of work to model the GETS experimentation 
and unveil how this experimentation supported the design process of the European 
carbon market place. 
 
Step 1: Mapping the existing knowledge: a first experimentation 
This first step aimed at structuring and testing the existing knowledge. Using both 
models of existing emission trading schemes (in particular the US’ SO2 market) and 
economic theory, a generic carbon market model was designed. The GETS1 
experiment was then conducted as follow: 
Each player was provided with a virtual profile – energy mix and installed capacity – 
and an emission target (8% over the emissions of year 2000). A total of 16 Virtual 
companies had to comply with both national electricity demand and emission targets. 
To reach their objectives, they could choose between three options: electricity 
trading, carbon trading, and investing in clean technologies. 
The market place for electricity and CO2 was a trading platform, provided by Paris 
bourse.  
This analysis of the existing solutions and the structuring of the available 
knowledge are therefore modeled with C-K theory as the explicitation of the relevant 
knowledge base regarding the existing design path (figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1 - C-K modeling of step 1, structuring the existing knowledge using a first experimentation to 
gather available expertise and to test existing market places 
 
This first step led the European electricity sector to acquire and structure different 
types of knowledge.  
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First, GETS 1 produced knowledge regarding the impacts of carbon markets at the 
utility level. Rather than a constraint, carbon trading was now envisaged more as a 
“tool for compliance” (GETS1, 1999: p25). From a strategic point of view, the quick 
delivery of a carbon price signal by the market was seen as a crucial factor to 
elaborate a compliance strategy – i.e. clean tech investments vs. market strategies 
(GETS1, 1999: p1).  
Second, GETS 1 provided interesting findings regarding the design of a carbon 
market and its rules. To elaborate long term strategies, companies relied a lot on the 
possibility of banking9 allowances from one commitment period to the other. “In a 
sector like the power sector, the size of investment in new production is largely 
dependent on the chosen technology: investing in a new 300 MW combined-cycle 
gas turbine may deliver more low-emission generation than what the company needs 
to comply with its CO2 objective. Banking made it possible to benefit from these 
additional reductions, on top of the possibility to trade them immediately” (GETS1, 
1999: p25). VCs relied also a lot on the grace period, so to say the possibility to buy 
or sell permits after the end of the commitment period. Such a grace period helps 
“handle the uncertainty related to normal business operations”, that may affect 
compliance (GETS1, 1999: p26). 
Third, GETS 1 revealed an unexpected property of carbon markets. As the 
emission objectives did not extend beyond 2012, companies had little or no incentive 
to build long term strategies. This leads companies to develop “uneconomic 
behaviors”. The wall effect is then characterized by abnormal transactions, patterns 
and prices.  
 
Step 2: Generating different conceptual models and the associate values 
The second step aimed at exploring the diverse design paths for a new carbon 
market place, i.e. involving new actors and testing three different models 
(benchmark, auctions, grand fathering). Thus, the goal was to test diverse options for 
the European carbon market’s architecture and to justify the selection of one 
particular model. The experimentation was therefore conducted not only in terms of 
testing economic theory but also to build the value criteria of each design path. This 
exploration of alternatives is modeled with C-K theory as the generation of new 
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different design paths and as the acquisition of new knowledge to make sense of 
these design paths (figure 4).  
To make the simulation more realistic and precise, the Steering Committee refined 
the mechanisms of the simulation: the platform enabled the trading of electricity both 
on spot and future markets; variations in primary energy prices were introduced; and 
carbon targets were defined beyond 2012. 
 
 
Figure 2- C-K modeling of step 2 – Different conceptual models for a European carbon market 
 
This second step led to the exploration of different alternatives for a carbon 
market, and allowed to build value criteria in order to help decision-making to 
converge on a single path, and to select the more adequate model for a European 
carbon market.  
 
Step 3 : Converging on a design path : the emergence of a new market place   
C space K space
Designing a carbon market place
using a benchmark 
model, with 
banking and 
penalties
using an auction 
model, with banking 
and penalties
Using an existing market 
place
using fictive 
energetic mix
electricity 
trading
carbon 
trading
investing in 
clean tech
using a grandfathering 
model, with banking and 
penalties me
project 
mechanisms
exploring a new model of 
market place
Market place in GETS 1
“Wall effect”
Clean technologies :
(existing, reachable, 
expected)
- investment needed
- return on investment 
- emissions reduced
European electricians 
knowledge on carbon 
market
New target for carbon 
emissions
other actors : cement 
manufacturers, chemical 
industry, etc
new possibilities of 
market places
UK Government: 
Gateway mechanism
European Commission’s 
knowledge and plans
(CCAP, 1999; FIELD 2000; IPTS, 2000)
The last step of the design process consisted in testing the model, i.e. converging 
from conceptual model to: clean tech, credit market, relocation of CO2 prod: 
hybridization of the European market with the global market. 
 
Figure 5- C-K modeling of step 3 – Converging on a design path 
 The modeling of the design process of the European carbon market with C-K 
theory allows us to understand the dynamics of knowledge and the exploration of 
different concepts for a carbon market.  
 
THE EVOLUTION OF RELATIONS AMONG ACTORS IN LINE WITH THE GETS 
LEARNINGS 
Before the GETS 
C space K space
Designing a carbon market place
testing and 
evaluating the 
conceptual model
using a benchmark 
model, with 
banking and 
penalties
using a auction 
model, with banking 
and penalties
within a model of 
existing market place
using fictive 
energetic mix
electricity 
trading
carbon 
trading
investing in 
clean tech
using a grandfathering 
model, with banking and 
penalties
Project 
mechanisms
exploring a new model of 
market place
Market place in GETS 1
“Wall effect”
Clean technologies 
European electricians 
knowledge on carbon 
market
New target for carbon 
emissions
other actors : cement 
manufacturers, chemical 
industry, etc
new possibilities of 
market places
UK Government: 
Gateway mechanism
European Commission’s 
knowledge and plans
(CCAP, 1999; FIELD 2000; IPTS, 2000)
In 1999, before the GETS began, the tax that the European Commission had been 
trying to introduce since 1992 as the corner stone of a European climate policy had 
failed (Braun, 2009). As one major reason, fierce lobbying from the industry sector 
undermined the Commission’s efforts to introduce such a tax (Wettestad, 2005). 
Within the business sector, some members were reluctant to any form of constraint. 
In Germany, for example, the industry – and the power sector in particular – was 
working on voluntary agreements with the government and was mostly opposed to 
the idea of a mandatory scheme, whether it would be a tax or a market. 
Nevertheless, in other countries such as Denmark and the UK, the power sector had 
gathered in favor of an ETS and launched trials to put in place ETS pilots at the state 
level (Braun, 2009). 
 
GETS 1: how it provided a common strategy for the European power sector 
At the Power sector Level 
As we show in the previous section, GETS1 provided Eurelectric with a basic 
practical understanding of the state of knowledge on carbon markets. Both Jean-
Yves Caneill and John Scowcroft emphasize the role that GETS 1 played at 
switching visions within the power sector. The experiment made it clear for the sector 
that a market was much more desirable than a tax if a mandatory regulation was to 
come up: “The simulation clearly showed that trading could help participants to best 
manage their CO2 emission objective together with their core activity” (GETS1, p25). 
The only actor that was still reluctant after GETS1 was the German power sector that 
saw the rise of carbon markets as a threat against the voluntary agreements it had 
been working on hardly (Wettestad, 2005). Nevertheless, at the end of GETS1, a 
consensus was reached among the power sector: a market was definitely more 
desirable than a tax, and further exploration of what such a market could be was of 
primary importance.  
 
At the Regional Level 
The presentation of this first experiment at COP 510 in Bonn in 1999 was well 
received and helped establishing a constructive dialogue with the European 
Commission (Caneill, 2011). This dialogue helped Eurelectric build the second GETS 
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rules consistently with the vision the EU had been developing: “[…] with the input of 
the European Commission, acceptable and effective rules have been defined for 
both, permits allocation and reporting procedures” (GETS 2, 2000).  
 
GETS 2: how it enabled the construction of collective expectations 
During the experiment 
In GETS2, some other members of the industry (the sectors that were to be 
introduced in the Green Paper) were invited to participate to the simulation. The 
exploration of various alternatives within the C-space enabled new forms of 
collaboration among actors in the industry. The exploration status of the experiment 
proved fertile to collectively test alternatives and debate them. For example, when 
the Italian industry asked for the implementation of DSM project, it raised concerned 
among the members that it would cause double counting issues. The status of the 
experimentation nevertheless enabled to collectively test, assess and reject this 
alternative. In line with the model they had been working on with their government, 
the UK power plants asked for a gateway that would enable the coexistence of both 
relative and absolute targets. The value of this proposition was also assessed by the 
market test. Eventually, very few actors used intensity targets and the results were 
not convincing. GETS 2 provided the industry with a collective expectation: a price of 
carbon that would be clear and “right” is needed to induce private compliance 
strategies. At the end of GETS 2, the actors had converged on a model for the 
carbon market, which is the one of GETS 2.2, and a “conjunction” was made.  
 
During the stakeholder meetings 
The stakeholder consultation, organized by the European Commission, supported 
“an intense process of collective sense making” (Peter Zapfel, 2011). It is important 
to notice that GETS is not the only experiment that fueled the stakeholder meetings. 
According to Peter Zapfel, BP and the UK government were being particularly 
constructive and transparent in their contributions to the consultation. Eurelectric 
presented the findings of GETS 2 as “political weapons” within the stakeholders’ 
consultation” (Scowcroft, 2010). The “solution” also provided a basis for further 
elaboration within the different working groups, as a common language regarding this 
model was made possible thanks to the collective exploration.  
 
Within the international negotiation process 
The Commission invited Eurelectric to present the results of GETS2 as an official 
European Side event at COP 6 in The Hague in december 2000. “I remember the 
European Commission’s room was full of people. The presentation of GETS 2 was 
attended as one of the most important side events of the Conference” (Caneill, 
2010). This presentation of the first carbon market pilots in front of the international 
community by Eurelectric was not neutral. It supported the collective learning process 
that was taking place around carbon markets.   
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION: THE ROLE OF EXPERIMENTAL PLATFORMS 
Using the C-K theory formalism (Hatchuel & Weil, 2009), we attempted to restore 
the complexity of the design activity that supported the performation of carbon 
markets. The nature of the design of the GETS device – collective crafting – enabled 
to structure common interests among the power sector, the industry and then, the 
main stakeholders. The creation of shared interests through collective design is key 
to understand the performation of carbon markets.  
Experimentation plays a crucial role in the conjoint process of designing and 
performing carbon markets. Here, economic experimentation consists in constructing 
an economic object and comparing the values associated to its different forms. Such 
experiments take place in concrete design spaces that have been classified in three 
categories by Muniesa and Callon (2007). According to this classification, 
laboratories refer to confined spaces which access is restricted to a few actors. There 
is a physical separation between the outside and the inside. Economic objects have 
to be transferred from the real world to the laboratory world to be studied. In contrast, 
in vivo experimentation breaks this distinction between the inside and the outside as 
the experimentation site is the real economy. The list of actors that might be involved 
is not defined a priori and is likely to evolve during the experiment. The design space 
the GETS experiment took place in seem to look like what Muniesa and Callon 
(2007) name platform. The platform configuration refers to a space that is more open 
than the laboratory and enables the participation of a great variety of actors. These 
actors that are defined by the platform manager and constitute a community of 
knowledge (Gets2, 2000) are likely to evolve along the experimentation process.  
Whereas in vivo experiments and laboratories have already received considerable 
attention by scholars, experimental platforms are still under described. An industrial 
platform is described in the literature as a modular architecture of relations, 
structured around a “core” (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Hatchuel, Lemasson and 
Weil, 2010). Such a core can be either a product as a car or a camera, or a 
component, as a microprocessor in the case of Intel and the high tech industry 
described by Gawer and Cusumano (2002). According to Ciborra (1996), a platform 
is a meta-organization which structure can take any form, from the matrix to the 
network. In this representation, a platform is a confused organization which strength 
lies in its ability to generate quickly any type of organizational structure – by 
reordering people and resources – to adapt to a changing context.  
Building on this previous work and on what we observed with the GETS, we can 
propose a first characterization of experimental platforms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4- The GETS experimental platform 
 
Experimental Platforms are design spaces that support collaborative relations 
between an evolving set of actors. They are organized around an instrumental core – 
here, the Gets device – that is being permanently experimented on and redesigned 
by the community of knowledge. Such a configuration enables the hybridization of 
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different sources and forms of knowledge. It also supports the confrontation of 
individual interests and the construction of a collective project. Experimental 
platforms are design spaces where knowledge can be shared, built and managed by 
epistemic communities (Amin and Cohendet, 2004). In the context of climate change, 
or sustainable development in general, knowledge on both scientific issues and 
regulatory frameworks is particularly distributed among a wide variety of actors. It is 
lacunar and often contradictory (Adant, Godard et Hommel, 2005). In such 
conditions, the construction of collective knowledge as a common good is essential 
to support the construction of institutional and innovation fields. They call for further 
description and analysis. Their design and their management are key variables that 
need to be addressed in order to better design sustainable development frameworks. 
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